15 November 2000

Text: Ambassador Holbrooke Remarks on UN Peacekeeping

(Such missions must stay until job is done, he says)

United Nations -- The most important aspect of UN peacekeeping operations is "not an exit strategy but success," U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke told the Security Council November 15. The goals for the mission must determine the timeline, not the other way around, he said.

"Of course we need exit strategies but they must be in the context of getting the job done," Holbrooke said, adding that the United States believes that "the international community has the resources to achieve its goals if it also has the political will."

The United States, which is the largest contributor to the United Nations, "wants to get the job done. We don't want to walk away from commitments prematurely," the ambassador said.

The strategy for leaving, he said, must be to leave good governance, accountability and stability so that the situation will not deteriorate into the problems that required the peacekeepers in the first place.

"An exit strategy must be directed towards a defining, overall objective -- not an arbitrary, self-imposed, artificial deadline," he said. "Artificial deadlines give hope to warlords, criminals and corrupt officials that they can outlast the international community."

Holbrooke made the remarks during a Security Council discussion on the council's decision-making process on closing or phasing out peacekeeping missions. The topic was proposed by the Netherlands which holds the council presidency for the month of November. Dutch Ambassador Peter van Walsum, council president, said the reason for the meeting was to explore whether to extend, modify or terminate a peacekeeping operation.

"There have been cases in which the council decided to end a mission or to reduce significantly its military component only to have the situation remain unstable, or worse, descend again into violence and chaos soon thereafter," van Walsum said. The theme of the session , he added, can be summed up in the phrase "no exit without strategy."

Holbrooke said that "establishing realistic goals and understanding how to meet them" must be a basic part of every council decision on peacekeeping.

Following is the text of Holbrooke's remarks:
(Begin text)

Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you so much for your creativity in having a discussion on an issue which seems, at first, abstract but in fact goes to the very heart of the Security Council and the United Nations' responsibility. Your creativity in forcing us to address, in a theoretical context, a real and practical problem deserves special commendation. This is an issue, by the way, I have spoken out on many times as a private citizen as well.

This is a time when UN peacekeeping is challenged as it has not been before and the demand for peacekeeping is outpacing capacity and resources, as the Brahimi report has made clear. Indeed, the very nature of peacekeeping has transformed. It used to be defined mainly as border-patrol efforts between states, and in some places, like Ethiopia-Eritrea, it will still be that. But increasingly, it raises questions of bringing peace and stability to conflicts within states.

This is the most difficult issue for the United Nations. Many countries in this room are legitimately concerned about the issue of sovereignty, about the limits of infringement upon that sovereignty by the UN. The principle of sovereignty is fully enshrined in the charter of the United Nations. I would just state at the outset, on that delicate point which is of particular concern to several of the members of the Security Council, that this is precisely why on an issue like the proposal for the protection of the Palestinian people put forward by Ambassador Al-Kidwa and Chairman Arafat, we say that it cannot be decided without the full consent of Israel -- precisely for that reason.

But once a peacekeeping operation is in place -- which is what the proper subject of today's discussion is -- deciding what conditions are necessary for scaling it down - in other words, an "exit strategy" -- should be a vital part of any peacekeeping mission. Establishing realistic goals and understanding how to meet them must be a basic part of every decision we make.

To be sure, many of our goals are not easy to meet. In places like Bosnia and Kosovo and East Timor and the Congo and Sierra Leone, the international community faces extremely difficult problems. These societies have been torn apart internally by divisions -- ethnic, political, religious -- and externally fueled by corruption and by tragedy. And in such places peacekeeping is a source of stability, and engagement of the international community offers the best hope for people to rebuild their lives. If we don't deal with the causes of the conflict, the United Nations is reduced to dealing with the consequences of the conflict. And that means the United Nations specialized agencies, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, end up spending much more money -- I stress this -- much more money in dealing with the consequences than we will in dealing with the causes. I need to underscore that one of the oldest sayings in the English language -- an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure -- applies directly in this case.

This means that we must be very careful when we talk about exit strategies not to confuse them with exit deadlines. We agree that it is highly preferable that peacekeeping operations have an end-state and not be absolutely open-ended. But an exit strategy must be directed towards a defining, overall objective -- not an arbitrary, self-imposed, artificial deadline. Artificial deadlines encourage belligerents to outwait the outside intervention, delay and wait until the international community goes away, at which point they can resume doing what they had been doing before. Artificial deadlines give hope to warlords, criminals, and corrupt officials that they can outlast the international community.

We learned this lesson in Bosnia, where after the Dayton Peace Agreement -- five years ago next week -- the United States set two arbitrary time limits for its own troop presence. First, a 12-month limit right after Dayton; and then, secondly, an 18-month time limit in January of 1997. Both these time limits were wrong, as I argued at the time. Finally, in December 1997, President Clinton took a brave decision, reversing American policy and announcing that U.S. troops would remain in Bosnia beyond the June 1998 deadline. As President Clinton said at the time, the mission should be achievable and "tied to concrete benchmarks, not a deadline." I cannot emphasize too strongly how important that was. It told those people who were trying to outwait the international community that we at least, the United States, were going to fulfill the mission, not have the mission defined by an arbitrary deadline. To put it differently, our goals must determine the timeline, not the other way around.

To take an extreme example, but an important one, take the case of Korea. Nobody in the world thought that international troops would still be in Korea 47 years after the cease-fire in Korea. There was no politician of any country under the United Nations command in 1953 who could have envisioned such a thing. But today, more than 35,000 American troops are still in Korea and universally accepted as an important part of stability there. They have the support of the American people and they no longer are an object of criticism by other nations. The reason for that is that the United States moved away from arbitrary withdrawal deadlines which were erroneously put forward in 1976-77 by the Carter Administration and moved forward towards a policy of keeping the forces there until the mission is fulfilled. And when we saw the historic summit of the two leaders of North Korea and South Korea last month, we saw an event which could not have taken place if the troops had not remained there. So again, an exit strategy -- yes; an exit deadline -- no.

The term "exit strategy" should never be allowed to mean a hasty or arbitrary departure from a strategic or stated goal that is supported by the international community as expressed through the United Nations Security Council. Rather, the term should mean the implementation of a comprehensive settlement. For example, crucial interim goals could be the establishment of rule of law, the arrest of those indicted for war crimes, and the creation of legitimate democratic institutions. In this regard, I want to praise UNMIK and the SRSG Bernard Kouchner for the excellent way in which they conducted and fulfilled the heart of one of the goals of UN Security Council resolution 1244: the elections in Kosovo last month. That was a partial step but it is part of a long-term exit strategy, although there are many other things that must be done.

Mr. President, let me suggest that the ultimate goal -- and therefore the ultimate exit strategy -- must be accountable governance and stability and the fact that once the international forces leave their departure will not trigger a return to the very things that caused the initial intervention. This is the sine qua non of a just and lasting peace.

History shows that this is true. Peace processes in El Salvador, Bosnia, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa and Cambodia have all been successful, or partially successful, because they have steered toward democracy and accountability with the critical result that armed violence was delegitimized. Political competition may continue but in these countries the wars are over. Those deserve to be registered as peacekeeping successes to a world which continually looks at the most difficult cases and tends prematurely to judge peacekeeping as hopelessly difficult. We reject that. We think peacekeeping is of vital importance to the world; the UN has an important role but not an exclusive one in peacekeeping and these are examples of successes. A lack of desire for peace is not what sabotaged the peace processes in Angola and Sierra Leone. What sabotaged peace in these troubled countries was Jonas Savimbi and Foday Sankoh. Therefore, the United Nations role in Sierra Leone needs to be strengthened not diminished. In Angola, I think we should take another look at that tragedy.

If we look at the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), we see again that peace-making and assuring accountability go hand-in-hand. We are learning at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st that peace and stability are inextricably linked to democracy, and to questions of tolerance and good governance. You cannot want peace if you are not prepared to accept democracy and accountability.

Mr. President, I fully support the views of your government and our Dutch colleagues that we should focus on getting the job done right rather than on getting out. Getting the job right is the primary responsibility of the member states of the UN, acting through a professional Secretariat that has the institutional capacity to help shape and implement our resolutions. I welcome our new Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno to the Council this morning. I say to him and to my colleagues again that implementation of the Brahimi Report, while not sufficient, is an essential next step in moving forward. I welcome the resolution that was passed earlier this week on that issue. I hope that the United Nations and other bodies within the UN will act to give the new Undersecretary General the additional resources he needs to carry out his incredibly difficult and vital job.

I feel, by the way -- and I must say this quite frankly -- that troop contributing countries, some of whom are represented among our distinguished audience today, have not, in my view, had adequate consultation from DPKO in the past. I don't believe they are adequately represented in the staff of DPKO. I say here today that as part of improving peacekeeping, I strongly urge that the troop contributing countries who carry the burden -- and increasingly carry the human risks involved -- have a stronger role in the consultative process and in the personnel structure of DPKO. I cannot understand why major troop contributing countries do not have any significant representation in DPKO. As for my own country, I don't feel that we have much representation either right now. With 420 people in DPKO, only one is an American. I hope that will also be corrected. But I speak here on behalf of my many friends in the audience who have talked to me directly about this and I support them strongly.

We are all aware that the DPKO capacity to plan, manage and backstop peacekeeping is severely inadequate. That's why we want the Brahimi Report implemented to the maximum extent possible. Unless we move decisively on meaningful peacekeeping reform, those that threaten peacekeepers across the globe may draw the conclusion that the UN lacks the will, the cohesion and even the capability to perform its essential peacekeeping function. And absent reform, those people who rely on the UN, who look to us for hope in places like East Timor and Kosovo and Sierra Leone and Congo -- will suffer, as they have in the past. As we have said many times before: we need to ensure that resources the UN urgently needs to conduct peacekeeping are in place as rapidly as possible.

The military component of peacekeeping -- while important -- can only bring about the stability necessary for the search for political solutions to political problems. Our job as the Council is to create the conditions necessary for this dialogue, assist it, and remain in place to help build and rebuild shattered societies with more democratic institutions. The UN must provide countries and regions a chance for peace.

During the Millennium Summit, the President of Argentina, President De La Rua, found a word that he thought would describe this doctrine. Speaking of the principle of non-interference, he said that there is an equal countervailing principle: non-indifference. It is a wonderful concept and I strongly endorse it.

Non-indifference commands us to fix UN peacekeeping to save it -- giving our blue helmets the means they need to succeed, which includes a realistic exit strategy based on sustainable commitments to peace and accountable governance.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me again thank you for giving us the chance to discuss this issue. I hope and pray that we will continue this discussion in private and that the underlying thoughts that bring us here together will also underlie the ongoing debate about implementation of the Brahimi recommendations and will assist our new Undersecretary General who has our prayers and hopes and our support in his difficult task.

Thank you, Mr. President.

(end text)