|
06/13/00 Unofficial Transcript: Richardson on U.S.-Russia Nonproliferation Efforts (June 13: Cites Dept. of Energy cooperative programs with Russia) President Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin recently took another step toward world security when they agreed to eliminate 68 tons of American and Russian military-grade plutonium -- 34 tons per side -- "that might have been used to build thousands of nuclear bombs," Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said June 13. The two leaders' actions came under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, designed to address the new proliferation challenges that arose with the Soviet Union's fall, Richardson said in a briefing at the Woodrow Wilson Center, an institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences in Washington. He discussed other Energy Department nonproliferation and arms control programs and activities with Russia. Among these are a new initiative to end the further reprocessing of civil plutonium; a protocol signed during the Clinton-Putin summit on the exchange of technical information about nuclear warhead safety and security, especially during transport and dismantlement; protection of the Russian navy's highly enriched uranium stores; and progress in downsizing the Russian nuclear weapons complex. Richardson underlined the Clinton administration's continued commitment to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Following is an unofficial transcript from the Federal News Service: SPEECH BY SECRETARY OF ENERGY BILL RICHARDSON AT WOODROW WILSON CENTER SEC. RICHARDSON: Thank you very much, my dear friend, former colleague, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lee Hamilton, who right now is helping us at the Department of Energy by serving on our Russia Non-Proliferation Task Force, when he isn't chairing the council here or rooting for the Indiana Pacers to win the NBA [National Basketball Association] championship. (Laughter.) [additional introductory remarks] This has become exceedingly difficult in a world of increasing change. Staggering change is taking place in Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. I was in Russia and Ukraine last week with the president, and the change under way is advancing more rapidly than even my last trip there, which was just nine months ago. This center is a terrific forum for grasping this change. I saw that you held a lecture last week called "Understanding the Challenges of Russian Culture: Recognizing Problems and Responding Effectively." Today, what I want to do is address how the United States and Russia are reexamining another culture, one that flourished over 40 years, that of the Cold War. Our meetings last week in Moscow continue our pursuit of a new culture, one dedicated to the eventual end of weapons of mass destruction. First, let me say something on arms control: Skeptics deride arms control as antiquated. On the contrary, however, arms control has helped lock in agreed, verifiable constraints on the U.S. and Russia, and now on Russian strategic nuclear capabilities. It's an idea that has worked, continues to work, and that will work tomorrow. Presidents Clinton and Putin discussed strategic arms control at great length during the Moscow summit. They signed a joint statement on strategic stability, reflecting our shared interest in preserving strategic nuclear stability and mutual deterrence. It was also agreed that we would continue talks over the summer on a START III agreement and possibly modifying the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty, in accordance with the Moscow statement of 1998 and Cologne statement of 1999 by the presidents. The second -- (brief audio break) -- in our helping to avoid a return to the nuclear brink is in our joint work reducing proliferation threats. And that's where Congressman Hamilton and Lloyd Cutler and former Senator Howard Baker are serving on a joint Department of Energy task force to look at some of these Russia nonproliferation programs. President Clinton created one of the strongest pillars in our national security when he launched the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, designed to address the new proliferation challenges that arose with the Soviet Union's fall. A week ago Sunday, President Clinton and President Putin announced conclusion of one of our most important threat reduction actions: the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposition Agreement. This agreement will result in the disposition, termination, of 68 tons of American and Russian military-grade plutonium, 34 tons per side, eliminating material that might have been used to build thousands of nuclear bombs. This agreement builds on the approaches to such plutonium management and disposition agreed to at the 1996 G-8 Moscow nuclear safety and security summit. Now it won't be easy or cheap. It will take 20 years and billions [thousands of millions] of dollars to carry this agreement out to the letter, but that is what we plan to do. We're going to need international financing for the Russian effort, which we expect to discuss at the G-8 Okinawa summit next month. So we've broken ground on military plutonium. Now we need to do the same on the civilian side, on the civil side. As some of you may know, we're discussing with Russia an important new initiative to end the further reprocessing of civil plutonium. Under the proposed initiative, we would do the following: One, halt separation of Russia's civil plutonium from spent fuel for at least 20 years. Number two, we would help Russia construct a dry storage facility for spent fuel, to alleviate their need to reprocess this material. Number three, we would cooperate on the science (underlying ?) the geological disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste. And lastly, we would pursue proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycles and technologies. During my trip with the President I was able to tackle still other issues that aim towards our better security. On June the 3rd I joined Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Adamov to sign a protocol that extends our agreement on the exchange of technical information in the field of nuclear warhead safety and security. That's a mouthful, so we call it (inaudible ?). This agreement gives us the legal underpinnings for technical cooperation on the safety, security and physical protection of nuclear weapons during their transport and dismantlement. It is also complementary to discussions held under the 1996 Moscow protocol on technical and scientific cooperation under CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]. Let me take this opportunity to state clearly that this administration remains committed to ratification of the CTBT. I cannot express our disappointment with the Senate decision to reject the CTBT. But perhaps history can offer perspective, for the Senate's vote against the CTBT was the first such Senate rejection since the 1919 treaty championed by President Wilson establishing the League of Nations. Eighty years later, Wilson, the so-called schoolmaster in politics, would likely give the Senate a failing grade. And there is much more to do. I'll be in Russia again next month, and I hope to advance these initiatives when I am there. I will also participate in the commissioning of a Russian Far East site where we're working with Russia's navy to protect their highly enriched uranium stores, a new element of our broader cooperation. And I will also take part in a ceremony marking the downsizing of the Russian nuclear weapons complex. At the Avangard (sp) plant, one of Russia's four nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly plants, Russia just moved about a mile of security fencing and is now ready to open more than 500,000 square feet of formerly closed areas to commercial development. This is a signal achievement of our Nuclear Cities initiative and one that I believe will lead to greater progress. We have to embrace such progress, not shrink its irresistible force, and encourage our Russian counterparts to do so as well. Those who came before us who made the greatest difference not only embrace such change, but they advanced it. In his legendary 14 points address to the Congress, Wilson might have well been speaking across time to us here today. In that speech, Woodrow Wilson said, "The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations will be their acid test of their goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests." Over our American history, we have shared the battlefield with Russia and we have stared across an abyss of obliteration, opposed to her. Great change is taking place in that nation today, and we must join our hands with theirs to make it the best possible change for the Russian people, the American people and the world. As Wilson said, quote: "Some may call me an idealist." Well, I do think that a world free from nuclear terror, free from the responsibility of stolen deadly materials, free from the threat of bombs raining down upon America is an ideal, and one worth our hardest work. We are privileged to live in a country where we are able to help bring that ideal to fruition. If that's being an idealist, then I join Wilson as proud to be one. Thank you very much. (Applause.) (end transcript)
|